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This paper analyses the windfall tax on the privatised utilities, introduced in the 1997 Budget. It
describes the main arguments put forward for the tax and sets out the details of its scope, scale
and method of implementation. The tax is examined against the guidelines of economic
efficiency, fairness and administrative feasibility. A one-off tax based on past profits should be
efficient, provided that the statement that it is one-off is credible. However, as a tax levied on
companies, it does not directly tax the windfall gains that were made in the past by shareholders
in the companies concerned.
JEL classification: H25, L51, L98.
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Our reform of the welfare state — and the programme to move the unemployed
from welfare to work — is funded by a new and one-off tax on the excess profits
of the privatised utilities.’
Gordon Brown, Budget speech, 2 July 1997
The centrepiece of the Labour Party’s first Budget in 18 years was the
introduction of a welfare-to-work scheme, designed to help the young and long-
term unemployed back into work. The programme, projected to cost about £3.5
billion, will be financed by a one-off tax on the privatised utilities. The Budget
revealed that the tax would raise a total of £5.2 billion in two stages, from a group
of over 30 privatised utility companies, and would be based on a measure of the
increase in the value of the companies during their first four years in the private
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sector over their value at privatisation. This paper discusses some of the
background to the tax, sets out the details and examines whether it fulfils some
traditional guidelines for tax policy.
II. BACKGROUND
As early as 1992, the Labour Party proposed that a one-off tax should be levied
on the privatised utility companies. This proposal became one of the Party’s main
pledges in its election manifesto of 1997, and was implemented in the newly
elected government’s first Finance Act. A windfall gain was said to have accrued
to the owners of the utility companies due to a combination of an underpricing of
shares in the companies when they were first offered for sale and the under-
regulation of the companies in their initial years in the private sector. The goal of a
windfall tax was to retrospectively claw back some of those benefits received by
the owners of the companies concerned and, in so doing, raise the revenue needed
to finance a welfare-to-work scheme.
What is the evidence that the companies were sold off too cheaply? With the
benefit of hindsight, it is clear that many newly privatised companies experienced
an increase in their share price in the first day of trading. In some cases, shares
opened over 50 per cent higher than the offer price, bringing an immediate capital
gain for those who sold out quickly.
1 This short-term increase in price indicates
that the shares were priced below the level that investors were prepared to pay for
them at the time. Over the longer term, some utilities continued to perform well,
while others did not do so well. Table 1 shows the percentage growth in utility
company share prices over and above the share price growth for a broad index of
companies (the FTSE All-Share Index). The growth rates are measured from
privatisation until three alternative dates: the first 100 days, the first year and the
first four years after flotation.
The share price index for the regional electricity companies (RECs) increased
in value by 26 per cent over and above the market as a whole in the first 100 days,
and that for British Telecommunications (BT) by 51 per cent. By contrast, the
Scottish electricity generators barely outperformed the market. Four years after
privatisation, the differences are more striking. The longer-term share price
increases could reflect changing perceptions of the strength of the regulatory
environment, which came into operation following the privatisations.
Were the regulatory regimes too lax? The companies covered by the windfall
tax were privatised subject to the statutory control of an industry regulator, whose
primary role is to ensure that all reasonable demands for the particular service
being provided can be met. In addition, the regulator has a duty to promote
competition in the industry and, where this takes time to develop or where a
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statutory monopoly is to remain in place, to protect customers through the setting
of controls on prices and quality of service.
2 The regulator also has to promote
social and national objectives, such as ensuring companies provide some
uneconomic services that meet the government’s wider policy objectives — for
example, providing emergency services and special services to the elderly or
disabled. If the regulatory regime fails, perhaps through insufficiently tight price
controls, the companies concerned will be able to exploit their market power at the
expense of their consumers.
The precise regulatory regimes vary between the different industries but are
essentially based on a system of price caps, which set upper limits on the rate at
which prices can increase — or, in some cases, set minimum price reductions. The
price caps were set at privatisation, to be reviewed by the regulator periodically.
They were designed to protect consumers from unwarranted price increases, and at
the same time to leave companies with an incentive to seek further gains in
efficiency. Since price caps were originally set at four- to five-year intervals, this
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TABLE 1




relative to FTSE All-Share Index (%)
First 100 days First year First 4 years
BT 11/84 51 52 18
British Gas 12/86 10 22 32
BAA 7/87 43 39 69
WASCs 12/89 31 58 93
RECs 12/90 26 23 124
English generators 3/91 28 27 109
Scottish generators 6/91 2 4 4
Northern Ireland Electricity 6/93 32 46 21
Railtrack 5/96 3 15 —
British Energy 7/96 17 21 —
Note: The privatisation dates give the month and year that shares in the privatised companies were first listed on the
Stock Exchange. The growth rates given are all measured relative to the original offer price, up to the three different
dates given, i.e. they are cumulative rather than annual growth rates. The share price data have been rebased to 100
at privatisation and scaled by the FTSE All-Share Index rebased for each respective privatisation date. The price
indices given for the regional electricity companies (RECs), the water and sewerage companies (WASCs) and the
electricity generators were calculated using individual company share price data weighted by their current market
values.
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allowed the utilities to hold on to any profits made from additional efficiency gains
that had not been foreseen at the time of the last review. At the next review, those
efficiency gains would be taken into account by the regulator, and the prices that
the companies were allowed to charge in the future would be adjusted downwards.
Hence part of the criticism of the regulatory regime arises from its very design,
which is to allow companies to hold on to the benefits of additional cost-cutting for
the period up to the next price review. It is possible that these initial price caps
were not tough enough, so that the benefits of high returns achieved by some
companies accrued more to shareholders than to consumers. A related criticism
has been that regulators have had difficulty in obtaining accurate information from
individual companies about their opportunities for efficiency gains in the future,
which leads to a general tendency for price caps to be too lax. This was illustrated
by the decision of the Director General of Electricity Supply, Professor Stephen
Littlechild, to recalculate the electricity distribution price controls announced in
August 1994, imposing new, tighter price caps less than one year later partly as a
result of the information provided by the stock market reaction to his initial
proposals. A third criticism has been that the impact of mistakes in the price-
setting process is increased by the gap between regulatory reviews, although, in
practice, these gaps have been shortened by the intervention of individual
regulators, not only in the electricity sector but also in the telecommunications, gas
and water sectors.
3
These two elements — the underpricing of shares and lax regulation —
encapsulate the arguments behind the tax. They are intimately related, since if
regulation had been stricter in the years immediately following privatisation, the
initial prices paid would have turned out to be a better reflection of the value of
those shares. It is quite clear from Table 1 that most of the companies concerned
outperformed the market significantly, for at least the first four years following
their privatisation, and that in some cases those privatisations occurred more than
10 years ago.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAX
The windfall tax was described as a one-off tax on the excess profits of the
privatised utilities — excess profits which arose because the companies had been
sold off too cheaply and regulated too lightly (enabling them thereby to exploit
their market power). The method adopted of implementing the tax did not attempt
to define excess profits directly, nor to define exactly what constitutes a utility, but
nevertheless it finds a tax base that attempts to capture the extent to which returns
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earned by shareholders in the privatised utility companies were excessive and does
so in a relatively simple, straightforward way. This section sets out the details of
the companies covered, how the tax is distributed between the different sectors and
how those amounts have been calculated.
4
1. Scope of the Tax
The tax applies to companies that were privatised by flotation and that face
economic regulation. The tax therefore encompasses the 12 regional electricity
companies (RECs) in England and Wales; the 10 water and sewerage companies
(WASCs) of England and Wales; the English electricity generators — National
Power and PowerGen; the Scottish combined electricity generators and
distributors — Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric; the company
responsible for electricity transmission, distribution and supply in Northern
Ireland — Northern Ireland Electricity; and British Energy, which owns part of
the nuclear-powered generating capacity. Also covered by the definition were
BAA (the British Airports Authority), British Gas (now BG and Centrica, after
their demerger in early 1997), British Telecom (BT) and Railtrack.
Companies not privatised by flotation were not covered by the tax, reflecting
the fact that it was being justified by the underpricing of shares at flotation. This
definition excludes, amongst others, the National Grid, which owns the network
for transmitting electricity in England and Wales. Although it could be argued that
the Grid was undervalued at privatisation — it was valued at approximately £1.2
billion in December 1990 and was worth £3.5 billion five years later — payments
of £50 per household in customer rebates made when the Grid was demerged from
the RECs are likely to have been a factor in the exclusion of the Grid.
Given that the tax was to act as a redress for overly lax regulation, the
definition includes only those companies covered by statutory regulation, where
the regulator had some control over the economic environment. As a result, the tax
excludes British Airways, which is not covered by economic regulation and faces a
competitive international market for its product, airline flights. BAA, on the other
hand, did not escape the tax. It owns, amongst other airports, Heathrow, Gatwick
and Stansted, which are three of the four airports large enough to face controls
over some of their charges by the Civil Aviation Authority.
5
The scope of the tax, therefore, captures the essence of the main arguments put
forward for its implementation in a pragmatic way, without entering into a debate
over what defines a utility, and relies upon the existence of statutory regulation to
infer market power, without attempting to quantify the degree of market power.
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2. Scale of the Tax
The tax is expected to raise £5.2 billion from the affected companies, as shown in
Table 2. The electricity sector in total pays 40 per cent of the tax, at £2.1 billion,
while the WASCs pay almost one-third, at £1.65 billion. The remaining revenue
will be raised from other companies, such as BT, BG, Centrica, BAA and
Railtrack. Prior to the Budget, stock market analysts estimated that a windfall tax
of about £5 billion was discounted into the share prices of the utilities believed to
fall within the scope of the tax.
6 As a result, while individual share prices adjusted
to estimates of individual company tax bills, the utility sector as a whole did not
experience dramatic price movements immediately after the Budget. There were
some immediate adjustments upwards and downwards, such as those of BT,
whose share price increased since it faced a tax bill at the lower end of the range
expected, and Hyder, owner of Welsh Water and South Wales Electricity
(Swalec), whose share price fell due to a higher tax bill than expected. The short-
term adjustments are difficult to disentangle from the general reaction of the stock
market to the Budget as a whole, while removing the uncertainty attached to the
tax might have been as important to the performance of the utility sector as the
actual amount of revenue raised and the details of the individual tax bills.
TABLE 2








Note: ‘Others’ covers BT, BAA, BG, Centrica, Railtrack and British Energy. Some of the companies have
combined into multi-utilities, so that tax payments will not be made according to the sectoral breakdown given
above. Scottish Power will also be liable for the payments of Manweb and Southern Water; United Utilities will be
responsible for the payments to be made by Norweb and North West Water; and Hyder will be responsible for the
payments of Welsh Water and Swalec.
Source: Budget speech (2 July 1997) and own calculations.
3. Method of Calculating the Tax
The tax payments are based on the difference between the value that was placed
on a company at privatisation and a ‘more realistic’ valuation based on its after-
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tax profits for up to the first four years after privatisation. The tax payment will
be given by
Tax V V p f = - t( )
where the tax rate, t, is 23 per cent, levied on the difference between the value on
flotation, Vf , and the valuation based on profits, Vp. The value on flotation is
simply calculated using the share price at flotation, p, and the number of shares
issued, NS. That is,
V pNS f = .
The valuation based on profits is found by scaling up the average of the first four
full years of post-tax profits stated in the company annual report, denoted here
byp, by a price earnings ratio, pe, set equal to 9 in all cases.
7 Hence,















This gives an approximate market value for the firms based on four full years in
the private sector. The calculation leads to the payments shown in Table 2. The
tax can be paid in two equal instalments, on 1 December 1997 and 1 December
1998.
Some adjustments to this basic formula are made, in order to apportion tax
payments between BG and Centrica, the demerged successors to British Gas, and
in order to take account of the fact that several of the companies were not wholly
privatised at their initial flotation. Where 85 per cent or less of the ordinary share
capital of a company was offered for sale at flotation, both the initial market value
and the estimated market value are scaled down by the proportion of shares that
were actually offered for sale. This affects BT, only 50.2 per cent of which was
floated in November 1984, and PowerGen and National Power, 60 per cent of
which were originally floated in March 1991. This adjustment halves BT’s tax bill
from £1 billion to about £500 million, and reduces both National Power’s and
PowerGen’s payments by 40 per cent.
The basic structure of the tax is quite simple, and individual tax liabilities can
be calculated using publicly available information. There are several issues that
arise from the use of this particular method, relating to the definition of post-tax
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profits, the use of average profits to estimate the value of the companies rather
than actual market values, and the use of a single price earnings ratio rather than
company-specific or sector-specific ratios.
Profit Measure
The profit measure used to calculate the tax is the after-tax profit published in
each company’s profit and loss account, drawn up according to accounting
guidelines. This measure of profit adjusts the operating profit (i.e. the company’s
profit derived from its normal trading operations) for other items such as non-
operating income — for example, interest and rental income — special provisions
and interest charges. The measure has the advantage of being clearly defined and
easy to obtain from company accounts. The role of the profit measure is to
establish an alternative equity value for the companies, to compare with their
equity value at flotation. This explains the use of a profit measure after interest
payments have been subtracted, since payments made on debt reduce the profits
attributable to shareholders.
Market Values
The estimated market value is based on the average after-tax profits earned in the
four years after privatisation. Using actual market values measured by the share
price times the number of shares in issue, for example at the end of the fourth full
year of accounting information, would have altered the distribution of the tax
slightly. The share paid by the water and electricity companies would have been
reduced, with a corresponding increase in the share met by other companies. The
use of actual market values would be very sensitive to the exact date chosen to
measure share prices, which can fluctuate quite dramatically, even over short
periods of time.
Price Earnings Ratios
The single price earnings (p/e) ratio, 9, is based on the lowest average p/e ratio
calculated by sector for the relevant years. Using the lowest has the effect of only
grossing up the profits of all companies by the average p/e ratio for the water
sector, which was 9.3 during those years. Companies that had higher p/e ratios, on
average, therefore have a lower estimated market value than they would have done
if sector-specific ratios had been used, leading directly to lower tax bills. For
example, if the average p/e ratio for each sector had been used to gross up profits,
both the WASCs and the RECs would have paid closer to 25 per cent of the tax
rather than 32 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. This would have been at the
expense of the other companies involved, redistributing part of the tax onto the
companies that had higher p/e ratios over their first four years.The Windfall Tax
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It clearly would have been possible to use alternative p/e ratios, which would
have made the calculation of the estimated value correspond more closely to
market valuations of the profits earned by individual companies or individual
sectors. The use of a single ratio simplifies the formula and reduces the scope for
negotiation over whether sector-specific, company-specific, average or actual p/e
ratios should be used.
This is not an exhaustive list of the questions surrounding the choice of tax
base, but serves to illustrate some aspects of the method actually adopted.
8 The
windfall tax takes into account the underpricing of shares at privatisation and the
subsequent under-regulation of the utility companies, by including in its scope
companies that were privatised by flotation and that are subject to economic
regulation. It attempts to reflect the extent to which the returns to those companies
were excessive through the method of calculating the tax base, without over-
complicating the actual calculations. However, as the next section explains,
refining the method of estimating a ‘more realistic’ valuation would not have
addressed the central difficulty that the tax was to be levied on companies rather
than on those individuals who actually received the excess returns, while it could
potentially have increased the costs of complying with and enforcing the tax.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF THE TAX
The question of how the tax was actually implemented has some bearing on
whether the tax fulfils certain guidelines for tax policy. Following Leape (1990),
these are whether the tax is economically efficient, whether it is fair and whether it
is administratively feasible. In other words, the tax system should cause as little
distortion as possible of the allocation of resources, it should distribute the tax
burden fairly between individuals and it should not impose an excessive
administrative burden in terms of compliance or enforcement. Although these
guidelines relate to the operation of the tax system as a whole, it is possible to use
them to help analyse individual taxes, bearing in mind that difficulties relating to a
specific tax can sometimes be addressed through other aspects of the tax system.
1. Economic Efficiency
In economic terms, an efficient tax is one that raises revenue with as little
unintended distortion of economic behaviour as possible. Given that the windfall
tax is a one-off tax based on past profits, no change in the companies’ behaviour
today can change the level of those profits earned in the past and so alter the
amount of tax that has to be paid. Therefore the only effect on the behaviour of the
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companies concerned is likely to arise from the loss of income brought about by
paying the bill for the windfall tax.
Since the windfall tax is levied on past profits, it has the characteristics of a
‘lump-sum tax’, i.e. it does not affect the cost of producing additional output and
it does not affect demand conditions. As a result, the prices that firms would like
to charge in order to maximise profits, given those conditions of supply and
demand, do not change. Of course, the prices actually charged by these companies
are subject to regulation: they are obliged to charge a price below their profit-
maximising price. Given an opportunity to do so, they would seek to raise their
prices, but since the windfall tax does not alter their marginal costs or demand
conditions, there is no economic reason why they should be allowed to do so. The
Chancellor emphasised his belief that the companies would not change their real
behaviour in his Budget speech, when he remarked that ‘it is my judgement that
the tax can be paid without any impact on prices, investment, or the quality of
service to customers; or in my view, on employment’.
9
This leaves the question of how companies react to the loss of income. Money
used to pay the windfall tax cannot also be used to finance investment spending.
This implies that a higher proportion of investment must be financed from external
sources, notably through higher borrowing. If an increase in borrowing raises the
cost of borrowing, this will increase the cost of capital, which represents a
legitimate reason for higher prices and also implies some reduction in the level of
investment.
10 For many companies, this would be a serious consideration;
however, for the regulated utilities, there is unlikely to be a significant effect on
their cost of capital since there is little risk that these firms would be allowed to go
bankrupt and little evidence that they cannot raise funds from external sources to
finance their investment. Levels of one-off payments to shareholders, such as
special dividend payments and share repurchases, have been particularly prevalent
in the electricity and water sectors — amounting to over £7 billion since
privatisation — which does not indicate that these firms expect serious difficulties
in financing their planned investment, despite the uncertainty caused by the
windfall tax and the possibilities of changes to the regulatory regimes under a new
government.
There is one serious caveat to the assessment that, on the whole, the tax is
unlikely to have a serious effect on the real economic behaviour of the companies
concerned. It relates to the credibility of the statement that the tax is one-off. If
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cost of financing their investment (i.e. the cost of capital). In addition, an increase in the cost of capital implies that
some marginal investment projects (i.e. those projects that only earn a return sufficient to cover the original cost of
capital) are no longer profitable.The Windfall Tax
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there is a suspicion that such a tax might be imposed again, this implies that the
future return on investment in the affected companies is lower than the return that
would have been earned if the tax had never been suggested. To compensate for
that risk, investors would demand a higher pre-tax rate of return on their capital in
order to be persuaded to invest in the utilities. In other words, the cost of capital
would increase for those firms, which would be likely to feed through into higher
prices than would otherwise have been the case, and might lead to lower levels of
investment. The fact that a windfall tax has been imposed increases uncertainty,
both for the companies affected in the period before the details were known and
for other companies that might suspect that they could be subject to a one-off
windfall tax in the future.
2. Fairness
Whether a tax is fair becomes a more difficult question to answer when the tax is
levied on companies. Although the physical payment is made by a company, the
effective incidence of the tax falls on individuals: mainly the shareholders,
employees and customers of the companies concerned. Exactly how the burden
might be shared between these groups — through lower returns on shares held in
the company, through lower wages for employees or through higher prices or
lower standards of service for customers — is in general a difficult question to
answer. However, in the specific case of the windfall tax, if the cost of capital
does not increase for the affected companies, then much of the burden of the tax is
likely to fall on shareholders. This is because, assuming that the cost of capital is
unchanged, neither the level of prices charged nor the level of investment carried
out should change. Given that the tax does not change the level of productivity of
the work-force, there should be no economic reason for employees’ wages to fall
as a result of the tax. Much of the effective incidence of the windfall tax should
therefore fall on shareholders rather than on employees or customers, through
lower returns.
Unfortunately, because the tax is imposed at the level of the company, it is
unlikely to tax all the shareholders who actually received excess profits from the
privatisation of these companies in the past, and it does tax many current owners
who have not benefited. The ownership of companies changes over time, and in
some of these privatisations, shares sold in the first day of trading amounted to
more than one-quarter of the shares issued. The effect of the windfall tax was
gradually discounted into the share prices of the companies that were likely to be
covered, in relation to the probability of being included in the tax, the probable
size of the tax bill and the probability of the Labour Party being elected. Hence,
different individuals earning exactly the same return in one company at flotation
would bear the effective incidence of the windfall tax or not, according to whether
they still held those shares on the day (or days) that the tax was discounted intoFiscal Studies
290
that company’s share price. In that sense, the tax arbitrarily taxes shareholders in
the mid-1990s, for gains that in some cases were made by others in the mid-1980s.
In principle, it would be possible to identify the individuals and institutions that
have owned shares in the utility companies over their lifetime in the private sector,
and levy a windfall tax on them in proportion to the total return received while
holding the shares, rather than taxing the utility companies. This would tax the
individuals who have actually benefited from the excess profits, but would make
the tax very costly to administer.
11 Unfortunately, once the windfall tax was
announced as a tax on companies and discounted into company share prices
according to the expectation of how much it would raise, no change could be made
to the method, scope or scale of the tax without creating windfall transfers to
current shareholders in the companies concerned.
3. Administrative Feasibility
A tax should be administratively feasible: it should not impose excessive costs of
compliance or enforcement upon taxpayers and tax collectors. The windfall tax is
based on a simple formula applied to readily available information — namely, the
published accounts of the utility companies plus some additional details of the
original privatisations. It is also a tax on 30 or so companies, rather than one
based on individual shareholders. Thus the costs of compliance for the taxpayer
should be minimal, since the tax payment is relatively easy to calculate.
There was some discussion of the costs of enforcing the tax prior to its
implementation, since some of the companies that expected to be liable suggested
they might challenge the legality of the tax. However, following in the footsteps of
the commercial banks in 1981, also subject to a one-off tax, the utilities seem
likely to find it simpler to grit their teeth and pay up on the appointed dates, rather
than mount a court case with an uncertain chance of success against a tax that was
a manifesto commitment of a newly elected government.
12
V. CONCLUSIONS
The windfall tax was the subject of much controversy prior to its implementation.
Its main justification was to tax the windfall gains received by owners of the
privatised utility companies as a result of these firms being sold off too cheaply
and subject to lax regulation in the first years following privatisation. As a tax on
companies rather than on individuals, it can only capture some of those windfall
gains: some of those who received windfall gains will bear the tax, while others
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who sold their shares before it was suggested will not, and the tax will also be
borne by later investors who made no windfall gains at all.
It has been constructed in a fairly straightforward way, related to the difference
between the value of the firms based on the profits earned in their initial years in
the private sector and the value placed on them at privatisation. It was levied on
those companies that were expected to be included in the tax and raised the total
amount of revenue expected. Although there are many refinements that could have
been made to the actual calculation of the tax liabilities of individual companies,
these would merely have increased the complexity of the tax without moving it
closer to a levy on all of the actual recipients of the windfall gains.
Since the tax is based on past profits which the companies could not affect by
their behaviour once the details were announced, it should have a limited effect on
prices and investment in the utility sectors, provided that the statement that the tax
is one-off is credible. This cannot be proved ex ante, and the very fact that the tax
was imposed seems likely to have long-term effects on the perception of the
government’s preferences over tax policy.
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